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The Laptop – Design or Desire? 
 
Synopsis 
The laptop computer has largely managed to retain its initial status as a marker of 
executive sensibilities – an electronic briefcase of cutting-edge technology. The first 
true laptop was the ‘Compass’ computer by GRiD Systems, which has been 
presented as a result of the convergence of technologies - a product that was ‘ready 
to happen’. This rhetoric of determinism [in this context, ‘design’] is, at odds with the 
long history of attempts to produce a portable computer [the desire]. This paper aims 
to use the case study of the laptop computer to highlight the tension between the 
discourses of technological determinism and the social construction of technology. 
 
Desire 
While recently exploring the material culture of the computer and constructing a 
history of its design
1, it became clear that for various reasons it was necessary to limit 
the scope of that particular study to that of the office computer only. Not only was the 
history of the design of portable computers a field in itself, but as cultural objects the 
messages they contained were vastly different. The office computer began life as a 
serious piece of scientific equipment that was appropriated for business use. In this 
role it took on two distinct forms – one as a tool of production (the means of entering, 
storing and manipulating large amounts of data) and one as a tool of control 
(managerial, strategic and financial planning). The semiology of these disparate 
objects and their representation could not have been more marked. One was 
presented as little more than an electronic typewriter operated by lowly female 
typists, the other as a combined computing and communication device on the desks 
of male managers with all the associated status they could muster. With the passage 
of time, and the removal of sexual stereotyping in the workplace, office computers 
have converged, become ubiquitous, non-gendered and status free to the extent that 
they have little in the way of any meaningful semiology, and we are left with a series 
of bland and boring beige boxes.
2 
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Portable computing, however, has always been associated with the higher end of the 
corporate echelons – an explicit display of status achieved by showing the need to 
use all available time for work-related activities; the need to be able to access and 
transmit data while away from the office to support important decision-making 
processes; the freedom and trust bestowed on the executive to work outside the 
supervised environment of the office.  
 
The identity of ‘the man in the suitcase’ – carrying his office with him (and until the 
early 1980s it always was a ‘him’) was a recurring theme of any corporate adverts 
and catalogues promoting portable computing. Status can be conveyed in many 
ways
3, and although inexpensive, and easily available, the mere act of carrying a 
briefcase can carry associations of authority and importance, even though there is no 
real economic value to one which works to give it a symbolic value, just the power of 
tradition or ‘role setting’. The ‘James Bond’ connotations of briefcases filled with 
electronic gadgetry must have been highly appealing to many executives. These 
people are so important they don’t go to work in a car – they aspire instead to travel 
by private plane and helicopter [Figs 1, 2]. 
 
For the purposes of this research, the definition of portable computing is an important 
one, especially with regard to the claim in creating the ‘first’ laptop computer. The 
term ‘portable computer’ is taken here to describe a device which is easily carried 
while travelling, has its own source of power, a means of storing suitable amounts of 
data, a full alphanumeric keyboard for typing input, and a screen suitable for 
displaying a reasonable amount of text. The term laptop defines a similar 
specification, with the added dimension of size, being able to be supported 
comfortably and easily on a seated person’s lap. 
 
Portable Data Terminals 
In truth, early attempts at portable computers were no more than dumb terminals 
having no computing power of their own, which could be connected to a telephone by 
an acoustic coupler and transmit sales figures and orders for travelling sales 
executives [Fig 3]. Although these units could send written messages (just as email 
today) it was actually illegal to do so, as the Post, Telephone and Telegraph 
Administration (PTT) had a monopoly on plain language data transmission. The lack 
of any suitable display technology and the need for ‘hard copy’ information meant 
that the technical drive behind these items was printing capability. Silent thermal 
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printers built into the terminals became a high priority, and ousted noisy mechanical 
teletype printers. 
 
Two of the many players in this field were the American company ‘Texas 
Instruments’ with their ‘Silent 700’ range of 1972, and the British company 
‘Transdata’ founded in 1970 by John Neale. Transdata’s ‘305’ model, although 
promoted as ‘The Executive Terminal’, was actually bought by other markets at this 
point. Neale states “With hindsight, it was not company executives who were 
interested in portable computing, they had little knowledge or experience of 
computing. It was the protective enclave of the data processing department. An 
interesting customer for these terminals, because they required no PTT modem and 
could be outlocated as demand required, were the programmers at ICL on maternity 
leave, since they could be easily located in employees homes economically. All other 
sales came from the Computer Time Sharing companies.”
4 Portable Data Terminals 
remained the only form of portable computing for the next five years. 
 
Portable Memory Terminals 
With the development of reasonably priced, durable memory devices a significant 
step forward in portable computing was made. The Texas Instruments ‘765 Portable 
Memory Terminal’ of 1977 was aimed directly at the travelling salesman, and 
included 20K of solid-state bubble memory to enable editing of around four pages of 
stored data before transmission over the telephone [Fig 4]. Truly portable computing 
– with more memory and display screens instead of only hard copy output - was still 
a few years away. 
 
Transportable Computers 
‘Adam Osborne – He Made the Computer Portable’ is a chapter in Portraits in Silicon, 
in which Robert Slater describes the development of “the first commercially 
successful portable computer”.5 Osborne formed his computer company in 1980, 
stating “I wanted to make something people could really use. I knew that people 
would be very happy to move a computer from one desk to another without getting a 
hernia, or without having pieces falling all over the place, having to unplug everything 
and plug it up again.”6  
 
Osborne’s specifications for the computer included it being small and sturdy enough 
for travel, easy to make, and cheap. The result, first shipped in June 1981, was 
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certainly all those things, but the fact that it was relatively small didn’t mean it was 
light [Fig 5]: “Early portable computers were brutes: typical of them was the Osborne 
1, a 13kg machine [in] a box the size of a small suitcase”.7 Others described it as 
being “as portable as a suitcase full of bricks”8 and Osborne himself estimated “that 
at least 80% of its portables never left the office”9. According to Slater, critics thought 
it looked like “a World War II field radio, with all its dials and wires in the front. Yet it 
was a computer: it had a detachable keyboard, a 5-inch screen, 64K of memory, and 
two built-in disk drives. And one could take it from home to office - and back home 
again!”10 
 
It was a hugely successful machine: Osborne became “one of the fastest growing 
companies in the short history of Silicon Valley”11 earning up to 100 million dollars a 
year and selling over 100,000 computers, before folding just as quickly in 1983. 
 
Although not the first attempt to put a computer in a suitcase (Xerox, for one, had 
done the same thing earlier), Osborne was the leader in a field of products largely 
following his exact format – a heavy computer inside a deep vertical case with a 
removable lid containing a keyboard. Compaq, DOT, Fox, Hyperion, IBM, ITCS, 
Jonos, Kaypro, Miracle, Philips, Scorpion, Televideo, Zita, Zorba and other 
companies all produced similar mains powered products, and the Osborne 1 was 
perceived at the time as “the archetypal transportable”
12 and represented the 
accepted form of serious portable computing. Even when the Osborne 1 became 
obsolete because of its dated operating system, the same form continued with the 
marginally smaller and lighter IBM-compatible Compaq. 
 
Although some of these computers (including the Osborne) were later available with 
optional battery packs, a suitable source of battery power remained the stumbling 
block for portable computers. 
 
Battery Powered Portables 
The problem of discussing ‘firsts’ in historical terms is fraught with difficulty, 
especially when the object is a complex one consisting of a number of components, 
and which is subject to a number of incremental developmental changes. Judging 
from the number of different computers that have been hailed as ‘the first laptop’ 
(particularly by their creators13) the accolade of designing this particular first would 
seem to be an important one.  
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When battery driven computers did appear in the early 1980s they were small and 
light, but had more in common with large hand-held calculators than with ‘real’ 
computers. They typically had very small amounts of memory, and small two or 
three-line LCD displays – hardly suitable for typing in large amounts of information. In 
fact, by 1983 two of the front runners in this class (the Tandy 100 [Also stated as 
“World’s ‘first’ laptop”
14] and the Olivetti M-10) were seen as striking due to being able 
to display eight lines of 40 characters and having 8K of Random Access Memory.15 
 
Taking these examples as “the latest step forward”16 the technical innovations 
embodied in the contemporary ‘Compass’ computer by GRiD Systems seem all the 
more impressive. 
 
Design 
The ‘Compass’ computer [Fig 6], designed in 1980, was the first true laptop by the 
definition used in this paper. This development was presented in the design 
discourse of the day as result of the convergence of technological developments in 
the fields of flat displays, rechargeable batteries, and computing memory; creating a 
product that was “ready to happen”17. 
The GRiD ‘Compass’ computer was the brainchild of John Ellenby, a British 
computer scientist who lectured at Edinburgh University and worked as a consultant 
to Ferranti Ltd on the Argus 700 computer before joining Xerox-PARC in California . 
Here, he worked on the ALTO computer (the precursor to the Apple Macintosh) and 
the laserprinter before setting up his own computer development company, GRiD 
Systems. While looking for a variety of people to create a product development team, 
he came across Bill Moggridge who had just decided to start a second office of his 
successful design consultancy in America. It was John Ellenby’s suggestion to put 
this office in Silicon Valley because of the huge opportunities, and so Moggridge 
started I.D. Two there in 1979. At the end of the same year Ellenby asked Moggridge 
to help with the industrial design and mechanical engineering of a new product. “The 
GRiD ‘Compass’ was the product of a very good integrated team from many 
backgrounds... GRiD Manufacturing [under Paul Hammel and Larry Gravelle had 
extremely strong influence on the shape and structure of the product... Bill Moggridge 
led the visualization and the Industrial Design. Steve Hobson worked very closely 
with Bill as the lead mechanical designer also Mike Nuttal worked closely with Bill on 
the ID”.
18 
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In order to raise the venture capital, Moggridge produced a conceptual model “based 
on a discussion that John Ellenby and [Moggridge] had about what a laptop computer 
could be like, and the collection of the technologies that were converging to make it 
possible”.19 This unit [Fig 7] folded in half across the centre in a geometry similar to 
that of today’s laptops. A small keyboard next to an off-centre display was to be used 
for telephone dialling. The appearance of a green and blue main keyboard was seen 
as too radical by the rest of the GRiD team, so later designs used “a more 
conventional looking keyboard, all black and keys which were a more normal shape 
rather than the Bellini–like style”.20 
 
When serious development started “the real restraints of power supplies, printed 
circuit boards and component availability started to alter the form”.21 This is where 
technological determinism comes into play – Moggridge states “...why was the laptop 
ready to happen? Why did John Ellenby come up with this concept? I think that it is 
mostly to do with the convergence of technologies. It would take a man of his vision 
to understand the possibility, but if you look at the reason it was possible to happen 
then rather than some other time, it was because all these different technologies 
were coming together”.
22 
 
The most important of these technologies in terms of the appearance of the product 
was the display. The choice was made of a prototype electro-luminescent display by 
Sharp – a pixel matrix display that could cope with graphics as well as text. “Nobody 
could really use it and John went straight to Sharp and made a deal with them”.23 
Sharp would get an exclusive right for all GRiD products to have their display in, but 
he would get the exclusive rights for the use of the display for the first year. A visit by 
Mr. Okano of Sharp Corporation led to an investment  by them of 25 million dollars, 
and a production line was built to manufacture the display specifically for GRiD 
Systems. 
 
The next technology exploited in design terms was the low-profile keyboard, which 
suddenly reduced in depth to only ¾” instead of nearly double that. A slim casing 
became a realistic possibility. 
 
In purely technical terms the latest developments in computer chip design were 
exploited, as was the novel use of ‘bubble’ memory, which was light, compact, stable 
and had come onto the market in the last few years. The GRiD had 256K of bubble 
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memory “because nobody would ever want more than that”.24 (Which may seem 
ridiculous now, but then Japanese portables that followed the GRiD a number of 
years later were sold with only 32K as standard). 
 
This use of memory ties in with another technological paradigm called ‘GRiD 
Central’. Moggridge explained “The concept of 256K being adequate was dependent 
on the fact that you would have information resident on a centralised server. So you 
would dial in [using the built in modem] to upload or download the files that you 
wanted to store or retrieve”.
25 
 
Power for the portable unit was a big issue, as the display consumed 80 watts and 
batteries to support such power consumption for any length of time were not 
available. The initial product had a very heavy battery pack option worn on a belt, 
which lasted for around ¾ hour, and so while battery operated it remained largely a 
mains driven device. 
 
Finally, the choice of material for the casing as magnesium involved a lot of 
technological development. The case material was required to be light, robust, and to 
conduct large amounts of heat away from the power supply. In the overall scheme of 
the project, price wasn’t too much of an issue, but weight was. Moggridge discovered 
magnesium being used in chainsaw casings that also had to be light and yet 
incredibly strong, but which cosmetically were not precise enough for such a product 
as an expensive computer. Moggridge’s team’s work with a St. Louis chainsaw 
casing manufacturer in developing precise, thin-wall castings enabled magnesium to 
become the “metal of choice for a lot of portable electronic equipment”
26. 
 
John Ellenby had a maintenance strategy for the ‘Compass’ computer based around 
a fairly new phenomenon called ‘Federal Express’, which became an important 
constraint on the design of the whole computer. He planned to achieve a one-day 
turnaround and guaranteed that if a problem occurred with a GRiD computer it could 
be sent it to GRiD by Federal Express that day and it would be fixed and sent back 
overnight to arrive the next day. This provided a sense of product support to the 
customer that was new at the time. 
 
To assess the implications of designing the computer for Federal Express shipping 
requirements, Moggridge hired an impact recorder and sent it by Federal Express 
and other shippers across the United States and back again to see what happened. 
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The recorder showed lengthy quiet periods interspersed with 20g’s or more of shock 
when loaded and unloaded by hand onto aeroplanes and trucks. Then it went 
through Federal Express’ automatic sorting machines and was subjected to up to 60g 
– the equivalent of dropping the computer onto a concrete floor from a height of four 
feet. 60g became the design spec for shock resistance. The end result could be seen 
as over-engineering: “In terms of impact [a production ‘Compass’] was able to 
withstand 135g’s”.
27 
 
Moggridge states that although rugged, “the design was aimed at trying to make sure 
it was very prestigious and elegant with the executive in mind.”28 In his view, Ellenby 
was aiming at executives because the world-wide market was large, they had 
sophisticated information processing requirements, and weren’t too price sensitive (at 
8,000 dollars, The GRiD was more than double the cost of an equivalent desktop 
machine). Although aware that in the view of the venture capitalists, “managers at the 
time did not use computers”29, Ellenby was convinced that the market was there, only 
latent. He had to “create the demand by taking the equipment out to show to 
people”.30 
 
However, when the product was launched GRiD’s marketing people were 
disappointed about the small number of people who took it up. “The price was so 
high, and it was too early for it to be generally acceptable. So it became very much a 
niche thing”.31 They sold a number to executives from the ‘Fortune 500’ companies, 
but not enough to repay the venture capitalists, and so started to look for other niche 
markets. The design specification of surviving the impact tests meant the unit was 
very attractive to the military for use in the field, and a large number of specifically 
adapted computers were sold to the American forces. It’s robustness also attracted 
the attention of NASA, and GRiD computers were screwed to the bulkheads in space 
shuttles where the graphical display showed astronauts where they were in relation 
to the ground when in orbit. A number were also purchased for use on the president’s 
‘Airforce One’ aeroplanes. 
 
The GRiD’s iconic status achieved through such exposure has been reinforced by 
MoMA, who placed it in their permanent design collection; Business Week, who 
dubbed it “the ‘Porsche’ of computers”
32; and by the American Industrial Design 
Society, who in 1982 gave the GRiD ‘Compass’ computer the only award for Design 
Excellence issued that year (as opposed to the normal 60 or so awards they usually 
bestow) for “substantially advancing the state of the art of computer design”.33 
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When the ‘Compass’ was devised, there was a need for a specialised operating 
system that could run a number of different software applications with a large amount 
of shared code to keep the memory usage down. When it became clear that the IBM 
PC was making MS-DOS the industry standard, GRiD made the ‘Compass’ IBM-
compatible as soon as possible. “Bill Gates liked the product so much that he agreed 
to write a special version of MS-DOS specifically for it”
34. With this determination, and 
by taking possible future technological developments into account, such as larger 
screens and flatter keyboards [Fig 8], the ‘Compass’ computer, with only minimal 
design changes, was in production for over 10 years – unprecedented in modern 
computing equipment. When Ellenby sold GRiD Systems in 1989, Tandy – who at 
the time were the world’s largest manufacturers of Personal Computers, bought the 
company. 
 
Conclusions 
The laptop computer John Ellenby uses today “has the same form, is the same size, 
and has the same aesthetics”
35 as the ‘Compass’. The durability of this designed form 
for portable computing, and the rapid demise of the ‘luggable’ computer pay 
testament to the ‘Compass’ as an important and successful piece of design in setting 
a precedent for the visual identity of the laptop. In both technological and aesthetic 
terms, the ‘Osborne 1’ and the ‘Compass’, although designed in the same year, are a 
world apart, and represent two very different approaches to solving the same 
problem. The Osborne 1 was basically a repackaging exercise: “[It] was a portable 
approximation of the desktop computer of its day. It had the same CPU, bus, and 
operating system, and ran the same software as its desktop counterpart”.
36  Ian 
Stobies’ interview with Adam Osborne highlighted that: “Osborne is not putting his 
trust in technical innovation”.37 In contrast, the GRiD team’s more conceptual 
approach paid dividends: “The chance to work for a new company on a completely 
new product was tremendously exciting… Here was a blank sheet of paper to work 
on, instead of the usual one already covered with product precedents, manufacturing 
equipment and distribution channels”.38 The visual precedent the ‘Compass’ set was 
far-reaching - the jurors of the 30th Annual ID Design Review, assessing the 
development and expansion of the GRiD Systems products, wrote “I.D. Two was 
upheld for establishing generic stereotypes across a wide range of equipment”39, and 
commented on the domination of the ‘black-box’ aesthetic across this category of 
products. 
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The vision of John Ellenby, who had realised the potential of flat-display technology 
for portable computing as early as 1973 while working on early plasma screens, 
brought together the very latest developments in the work of a large team of diverse 
specialists in flat panel displays, non-volatile data storage, miniaturised modems and 
multi-tasking operating system software; which, while cutting-edge, had nevertheless 
all been previously imagined. John’s success in uniting these disparate advances 
resulted in a product which was “about four years ahead of its time – too advanced 
for many people”. 
 
However, the pre-history of the laptop shows a continual stream of developments in 
which the concept of the laptop’s capabilities, if not the actual form, were a clear aim 
for many. There was a distinct desire for computing technology at a very personal 
level, even if the exact nature of its use was confused. Alan Kay’s ‘Learning 
Research Group’ at Xerox-PARC saw the ALTO as a step towards the ‘dynabook’, a 
powerful portable computer in the form of “a personal dynamic medium the size of a 
notebook which can be owned by everyone and has the power to handle virtually all 
of its owners information-related needs”.
40 Kay envisaged these owners as including 
“children form age 5 or 6 and ‘non computer adults’ such as secretaries, librarians, 
architects, musicians, housewives, doctors and so on”.41 John Ellenby imagined a 
different user. In 1976 he spoke to one of the managers who had received the ALTO 
computer on which he had worked. “He told me the ALTO was great, but that he had 
stopped depending on it as he couldn’t take it with him to where problems needed 
solving. I said I could make one the size of a suitcase – he said ‘no – make it half the 
size of my briefcase!’ That’s where the aim for the size of the GRiD computer came 
from”.
42 “He gave me the belief that there was indeed demand for a powerful, really 
portable computer”.43 
 
Consequently, it is fair to say that if the GRiD ‘Compass’ computer had not been 
designed in 1980 it would have arrived eventually, although not necessarily in the 
same form. Ellenby believes “we would have had ‘luggables’ for [another four 
years]”44, but Kay’s vision of the ‘Dynabook’ predicted the exploitation of 
technological advances in miniaturisation with some accuracy. 
 
As this case study shows, a single perspective on design history can be problematic, 
and two very different histories could be written from the perspective of technological 
determinism, and from the perspective of the social construction of technology. More 
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fruitful conclusions may be drawn from acknowledging the inevitable overlap between 
these two discourses of ‘Design’ and ‘Desire’. 
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Fig 1 Transdata ‘Executive’ Terminal, 1975 
 
 
 
Fig 2 Texas instruments ‘Silent 700’ 1972 
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Fig 3 Texas Instruments ‘Model 725’, 1972 
 
 
 
Fig 4 Texas Instruments Model 765, 1977 
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Fig 5 Osborne 1, 1981 
 
 
 
Fig 6 GriD Laptop, 1981 
 
 
 
Fig 7 GriD Initial concept model, 1980 
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Fig 8 Grid Mark II, 1983
 
 
